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More Competition, More Direct Sourcing? 
Exploring Direct-Trading Relationships between Large Retailers and Manufacturers 
in Japan, 1990-2005 
1. Introduction 
Japanese distribution channels have been described as networks of institutionalized relationships 
that emphasize cooperation rather than competition, evidenced by the fact that even large retailers1 
source through wholesalers (Saeed & Mayo 1990; Johansson & Hirano 1996;  Min 1996; Lackman 
et al. 1997; Drew et al. 1998; Maguire 2001; Martin & Herbig 2002) despite the efficiency gains 
that direct sourcing from manufacturers could provide (WTO 1997; Maruyama 2004). 
However, severe economic distress after the collapse of the asset bubble in Japan at the beginning 
of the 1990s posed a serious challenge to the institutional stability of the Japanese distribution 
system. Competition between channel members intensified and forced them to exploit previously 
unrealized efficiency gains in their supply chains (Schaede 2008). Manufacturers and retailers alike 
reduced the number of wholesalers with whom they contracted, a measure that wholesalers 
compensated for by expanding their coverage with mergers and acquisitions (Johansson & Hirano 
1996). In addition, Japanese retailers increasingly sought direct-trading relationships with 
manufacturers, not least in order to exploit the advantages of information technology (Johansson & 
Hirano 1996; Cabinet Office 1998).2 One of the retailers reported to have switched at least partly to 
a direct-purchasing model was Aeon (Dodd 2003; Aoyama 2007). 
While government statistics suggest that wholesale circuity3 improved between 1990 and 2005, 
analyzing whether the Aeon case reported is an exception or, rather, reflects a general trend among 
major retailers is difficult due to a lack of pertinent statistics on direct-trading relationships between 
retailers and manufacturers (Lottanti von Mandach 2010). To examine this topic, three alternative 
approaches are possible: first, a case study approach; second, large-scale data gathering; or third, an 
                                                            
1 According to the Japanese Statistics Bureau, large-scale retailers refer to department stores and supermarkets, each 
with 50 employees or more. See http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-13e.htm. 
2 Large-scale retailers generally tend to source a larger share of their goods directly from manufacturers because of 
the increased efficiency that direct sourcing can provide. 
3 Wholesale circuity refers to the number of separate title-holding intermediaries between a manufacturer and a 
retailer. 
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indirect analysis approach.  
The difficulty of the case study approach lies in choosing a representative case that shows a strong 
bivariate causal relationship from a large population of potential cases. In the social sciences, 
however, few such relationships are found. Usually more than one causal factor must be evaluated 
(Gerring 2007). Next, large-scale data gathering is difficult, if not impossible, for a number of 
reasons, such as a lack of access to companies as well as resource constraints. We therefore choose 
the third option and explore this question indirectly by relying on existing data and research. The 
framework as shown in Graph 1 will guide our exploratory efforts. 
 
Graph 1: Framework 
Source: Author. 
 
We start by exploring the question of whether direct sourcing was a strategic priority for large 
retailers during the time frame studied. If so, to implement such a strategy, retailers must have the 
resources to either integrate the distributive functions performed by wholesalers and/or have the 
power4 to shift these functions to manufacturers (and make them bear the costs). Furthermore, 
retailers must have the power to circumvent the wholesale sector. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 addresses the strategy and resources of large retailers 
in the time frame studied. Section 3 explores the question and sources of retailer power over 
manufacturers and wholesalers. Section 4 then summarizes the main findings. 
                                                            
4 Retailer power is the ability of retail firms to obtain from suppliers more favorable terms than those available to 
other buyers or than would otherwise be expected under normal competitive conditions (Dobson 2005). 
Direct sourcing as 
strategy priority
Yes
No
Power to shift 
distributive functions
Resources to integrate 
distributive functions
  3 
2. Strategy and resources of major retailers 
Throughout the 1990s, the financial situation of large retailers was dire. Sales stagnated or 
decreased, consumer confidence was weak and retail spending per household fell (JETRO 2004). 
To make matters worse, retailers were forced to generate cash flow to service their high levels of 
interest-bearing debt, a relic of the bubble economy in the second half of the 1980s (Dawson & 
Larke 2004).  
To increase sales, they chose to maximize sales space, open new stores, expand product selection 
and increase the frequency of new product introduction (Dawson & Larke 2004; JETRO 2004; 
JETRO 2007).5 Among reported measures to increase efficiency, they streamlined their supply 
chain and reduced the number of wholesalers that they contracted with. The question is whether an 
increase in direct sourcing was part of their strategy to lower their supply chain costs (Maruyama 
2004; The Economist 2004). Given their strategy of increasing sales by maximizing sales space, 
expanding product selection and increasing the frequency of introducing new products, reducing the 
number of wholesalers is plausible for a number of efficiency-related reasons; increasing direct 
sourcing, however, is not: 
1. According to Maruyama (2004), delivery frequency from wholesalers to retailers increased 
during the time frame studied. This suggests that retailers increasingly relied upon 
wholesalers for storing the goods and the timely supply of merchandise in accurate, small 
quantities, because maximizing sales space and expanding the number of product items 
requires storage space in stores to be minimized. 
2. Dawson & Larke (2004) report that the use of consignment purchase agreements and 
supplier-employed sales staff in department stores increased after 1990.6 This observation 
fits well with the strategy of competing on product selection under financial constraints. 
Consignment purchase agreements with wholesalers lower the retailers' risk associated with 
                                                            
5 According to data provided by the Statistics Bureau of Japan, the sales space of department stores, for example, 
increased by 10%, while that of supermarkets increased by 112% (Statistics Bureau of Japan, Historical Statistics, 
Chapter 13 Domestic Trade, Table 13.11). The number of department stores decreased from 378 in 1990 to 345 in 
2005 (-9%), while that of supermarkets increased from 1,980 in 1990 to 3,940 in 2005 (+99%). 
Competition in product selection rather than on price would explain why only some of the largest retailers took 
advantage of the new regulatory environment by opening large numbers of new stores. According to (Davies & Itoh 
2001), there was an increase in the average store size among large retailers, but there was less of an increase in the 
total number of large stores. Retailers sought to benefit from an increase in scope (that is, obtaining a wider range 
of products at the same location by increasing store size) rather than scale (i.e., generating greater purchasing power 
from greater sales of the same goods by increasing store numbers).  
6 Kikkawa & Takaoka (1998) describe how these trade practices took root the in the post-war economic rehabilitation 
period . 
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the frequent introduction of new products and simultaneously lower the personnel costs 
associated with directly paid employees.7 
3. Competing on product selection requires that retailers have the resources to access a wide 
range of products. Sourcing through wholesalers allows retailers to access a large number of 
manufacturers while keeping the related costs comparatively low. 
Thus, from the point of view of strategy and resources, it is plausible that direct sourcing did not 
increase substantially during the time frame studied. 
3. Power 
To increase direct sourcing, retailers must have the power to a) make manufacturers adopt direct-
trading arrangements and bear the related costs, and b) circumvent the wholesale sector. 
3.1 Power over manufacturers 
In this section, we analyze two potential sources of retailer power over manufacturers. To this end, 
we consider two main indicators of retailer power: market concentrations and the value share of 
private labels8 in total retail sales. For the sake of international comparisons, we analyze the 
numbers on a national level. 
3.1.1 Market concentration 
Market concentration relates to the number of firms that account for the total production within a 
given industry. Market concentration is often indicated by how much of the total market the top 
firms control, i.e., what their market share is. The most commonly used concentration ratios (CR) 
are the four-firm and five-firm concentration ratios (CR4 and CR5). 
Studies have found a negative relationship between retail concentration (the market share of the 
largest retailers in a retail market) and manufacturers’ profit margins (Inderst & Mazzarotto 2008). 
Thus, market share is a necessary condition and proxy for retailer power. According to the UK 
Competition Commission, a CR1 as low as 8% can already give a retailer significant power 
(Dobson 2005). Market concentration is, however, only a starting point for the analysis, because 
other factors such as a favorable image among consumers influence retailer power as well (Amato 
                                                            
7 Under such an arrangement, the risk of new product introductions is borne by manufacturers. Manufacturers reduce 
this risk by dispatching their own sales personnel and acquiring expertise by closely following and anticipating 
consumer trends. The extensive use of consignment purchase agreements eventually results in manufacturers 
controlling sales floor operations and retailers depending on manufacturers' market expertise and dispatched 
employees for both know-how and cost-related reasons. See Kikkawa & Takaoka (1998). 
8 Private labels are products owned and exclusively distributed by one or more retailers. 
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and Amato, 2009). Furthermore, because a market has a demand and a supply side, not much can be 
deduced about retail power from retail concentration ratios, unless the ratios are interpreted, at a 
minimum, through comparison with concentration levels prevailing in manufacturing markets 
(Amato & Amato 2009). We therefore compare the market concentrations (CR) of the retail 
industry with the product market concentrations in 40 processed food and 37 non-food product 
markets. We choose products that are available in supermarkets and/or department stores, and for 
which the Japan Fair Trade Commission provides data for the time frame studied. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the total retail market concentration in Japan more than doubled 
between 1990 and 2005. On the CR3 level, it increased from 3.1% in 1990 to 7.7% in 2005, and on 
the CR4 level, it increased from 3.8% in 1990 to 8.7% in 2005. In 2005, the biggest retailer (Aeon)  
had a share of 3.4% of the total retail market in Japan (CR1=3.4%). 
 
Figure 2: CR1-5 of the total retail market in Japan, 1990 – 2005 
Sources: JETRO (2007), Nikkei Marketing Journal (1992, 1996, 2005); Dawson and Larke (2004). 
 
Despite this doubling in the retail market concentration between 1990 and 2005, market 
concentration in Japan is still very low when compared internationally. In 2002, CR1 was 23% in 
Great Britain, 14% in France, Germany and Spain, 10% in Italy, and 19% in the U.S., while CR5 
was 67% in Great Britain, 56% in France, 36% in Germany, 26% in Italy, 52% in Spain, and 32% 
in the U.S. (Dobson 2005). 
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We now compare retail market concentrations with market concentrations prevailing in the selected  
non-food and food product markets. Figures 3 and 4 show their mean CR3-5 and the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI indicates how market shares are distributed within an industry, 
and is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the market. As can be 
seen, both the mean concentration ratios as well as the HHI increased in the time frame under 
consideration. The mean CR4 of the selected non-food product markets increased by 6pp from 77% 
in 1990 to 83% in 2005, while that of the selected food product markets increased by 18pp from 
59% to 77%. The increase in the HHI also indicates that these product markets became less 
competitive. The finding that market concentration across product markets increased is consistent 
with Cortes (2006). 
 
Figure 3: CR3-5 and HHI of selected non-food product markets 
Source: Based on data from the Japan Fair Trade Commission. 
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Figure 4: CR3-5 and HHI of selected food product markets 
Source: 
Based on data from the Japan Fair Trade Commission. 
 
We can summarize the results as follows: First, product market concentration levels are 
considerably higher than total retail market concentration. Second, the concentration ratios of both 
the demand and supply side increased during the time frame studied, indicating that neither side 
could unilaterally and substantially increase power. Third, the retail concentration in Japan is very 
low from an international perspective. As noted above, even the biggest retailer in 2005, Aeon, had 
a market share of only 3.4%. This would explain why even Aeon had difficulty convincing 
manufacturers to enter into direct trading relationships (Aoyama 2007). The low figure in total retail 
concentration is reflected in the fact that only a few nationwide retailers were operating at the time 
(JETRO 2004). In the drug store market, for example, even the industry-leading chains were only 
regional, and there were no national players. Similarly, in the home improvement industry, there 
were no nationwide chains. The industry leaders were all regional chains. Japan still had a large 
number of department store chains, whereas in many Western nations, the number of department 
stores had been reduced to only a few. As of July 2003, there were 99 department store operators in 
Japan. Only 10 out of these 99 operated nationwide, and the same 10 accounted for 57% of the total 
department store sales. The remaining 43% were regional department stores that focused on their 
respective prefectural capital (JETRO 2004). 
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3.1.2 Value share of private labels 
We now turn to the second proxy for retailer power, the value share of private labels in total retail 
sales. With the introduction of private labels, retailers become direct competitors to brand producers 
(Dobson 1998). Private labels lead to more competitive manufacturing markets and enhance retailer 
power because retailers can credibly threaten to market their own private label products at the 
expense of the manufacturer's branded products (Dobson 2005). 
In 2000, the worldwide average value share of private labels in packaged consumer goods was 14%. 
The share in Western Europe and in the United States was 20%, and in Australasia, it was 15%. In 
Japan, in contrast, the value share of private labels was only 2%, which is significantly below the 
worldwide average. Only Central and Eastern Europe as well as China showed lower figures 
(Kumar & Steenkamp 2007).  
In 2005, the value share of private label products across 38 countries and 80 categories was 17% 
over the 12 months ending the first quarter of 2005, compared to 15% in 2003 (A.C. Nielsen 2005). 
The value share varies widely across the countries included in the study. Switzerland records the 
highest share of private label products, at 45%, and the Philippines registers the lowest, at less than 
1%. The emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America had fewer developed 
private label markets than did Europe or North America. Japan’s share of private label products was 
4%, a low figure when compared internationally, with no change from the figures in the (A.C. 
Nielsen 2003) report. 
Thus, in the Japanese retail sector, market concentration ratios and the value share of private labels 
are both very low when compared internationally. Assuming that market concentration ratios and 
the value share of private labels are a proxy for retailer power in general, we can therefore 
hypothesize that the power of Japanese retailers is rather weak. Furthermore, the retailers' 
increasing dependence on consignment sales and dispatched sales personnel (see section 2) must 
have contributed to their weak bargaining position. 
Why then are both retail concentration and private label value shares so low from an international 
perspective? According to A.C. Nielsen (2005), four factors foster high retail concentration: 1), the 
presence of aggressive discounters that 2) sell a limited selection of products (mainly shelf-stable 
food) at 3) a very low price and 4) with high purchase frequency. In Japan, purchase frequency is 
high, but Japanese retailers competed on product selection rather than price and increased the 
number of products offered to consumers rather than limiting their selection. Furthermore, Japanese 
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consumers expect to find a variety of fresh products (Aoyama 2007). With regards to the low 
private label value share, the value share of private labels is connected with retail concentration: the 
higher retail concentration is, the higher the value share of private labels (Dobson 2005). From this 
perspective, the small value share of private labels in Japan simply reflects the low retail market 
concentration. Based on the insights of section 2, one might also argue that the low value share 
reflects the retailers' lack of market knowledge and resources to develop private label products, as 
well as their dependence on manufacturers of branded products. Kojima (2010) argues similarly, 
commenting that developing private labels was too risky a strategy even for major retailers during 
the time frame studied. 
3.2 Power over wholesalers 
In this section, we investigate whether retailers had the power to circumvent the wholesale level 
when establishing direct-trading relationships with manufacturers. 
Japanese wholesaling has widely been regarded as moribund (Larke & Davies 2007), particularly 
because the use of the Internet for business transactions has rendered wholesalers redundant as 
order-processing intermediaries between retailers and manufacturers (The Financial Times 2000). 
This view, however, ignores the fact that General Trading Companies (GTC), which are large and 
highly integrated wholesale organizations, have actually strengthened their positions in the retail 
and wholesale markets. According to Larke & Davies (2007), GTC have, on the one hand, 
enhanced their position in the domestic wholesale sector by investing in or merging with other 
wholesale firms. On the other hand, they have assumed control of major retailers, which represents 
a new direction in GTC strategy (Meyer-Ohle 2004).9 By capitalizing on both their existing 
embeddedness in the domestic market and their international supply network, the GTC can 
efficiently supply Japanese retailers with both domestic and imported products. By assuming a 
significant stake in major retailers, the GTC can diminish the retailers' ability to establish direct 
trading-relationships with manufacturers because the GTC may insist on using their own 
(wholesale) facilities (Meyer-Ohle 2004). Given these dependencies, it is questionable whether 
large retailers had the power to circumvent the wholesale level. 
                                                            
9 For example, in 1998, Itochu acquired a 30% stake in FamilyMart, a convenience store company; in 2000, 
Mitsubishi acquired 20% of Lawson, and in 2002, the company acquired a 10% share of am/pm, both convenience 
store companies; in 2000, Marubeni acquired a 10% equity stake in the leading supermarket company, Maruetsu, 
from Daiei and increased its share to 30% in 2001; later, the company became a shareholder of Daiei itself by 
acquiring 5% of the company; in 2003, Maruetsu and Marubeni together acquired a 17.5% share of Tobu store, a 
mid-sized operator of food supermarkets; in 2000, Sumitomo purchased an equity stake of 12.5% in Seiyu, a major 
operator of food supermarkets and general merchandising stores (Meyer-Ohle, 2004). 
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4. Conclusion 
This study explores the question of whether increased competition in the Japanese distribution 
system led to more retailer-initiated direct-trading relationships between large retailers and 
manufacturers in Japan in the years from 1990 to 2005. Due to a lack of pertinent data to verify this 
claim, we chose to explore the question indirectly. Our synthesis of existing data, research and 
available information indicates that direct sourcing did not substantially increase during the time 
frame studied. First, direct sourcing was not a strategic priority for large retailers. Second, major 
retailers did not have the power to shift the distributive functions from wholesalers to 
manufacturers, nor, third, did they have the resources to assume them themselves. Thus, although 
competition within the Japanese distribution system increased, the basic sourcing strategy of large 
retailers through wholesalers remained largely intact. 
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